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Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal 
Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note  
 
 
Stephen J. Morse* 
 
This brief diagnostic note identifies a cognitive pathology, “Brain Overclaim 
Syndrome [BOS],” that often afflicts those inflamed by the fascinating new 
discoveries in the neurosciences.  It begins by suggesting how one should think 
about the relation of neuroscience (or any other material explanation of human 
behavior) to criminal responsibility, distinguishing between internal and external 
critiques based on neuroscience.  It then describes the signs and symptoms of BOS, 
the essential feature of which is to make claims about the implications of 
neuroscience for criminal responsibility that cannot be conceptually or empirically 
sustained.  It then applies the diagnostic lens of BOS to the claims in Roper v. 
Simmons.  Finally, the article recommends Cognitive Jurotherapy [CJ] as the 
therapy of choice for BOS. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Brains do not commit crimes; people commit crimes.  This conclusion should 
be self-evident, but, infected and inflamed by stunning advances in our 
understanding of the brain, advocates all too often make moral and legal claims 
that the new neuroscience does not entail and cannot sustain.  Particular brain 
findings are thought to lead inevitably to moral or legal conclusions.  Brains are 
blamed for offenses; agency and responsibility disappear from the legal landscape.  
For example, in Roper v. Simmons,1 advocates for abolition of the death penalty for 
adolescents who committed murder when they were sixteen or seventeen years old 
argued that the demonstrated lack of complete myelination of the cortical neurons 
of the adolescent brain was reason to believe that sixteen and seventeen year old 
murderers were insufficiently responsible to deserve capital punishment.  These 
types of responses, I claim, are the signs of a disorder that I have preliminarily 
entitled Brain Overclaim Syndrome [BOS].   
This brief diagnostic note first lays the contextual foundation for how one 
should think about the relation of neuroscience to criminal responsibility.  Then it 
attempts to identify the nature of the pathology, to offer the criteria for the 
                                                                                                                                                   
*   Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law & Professor of Psychology and Law in 
Psychiatry, University of Pennsylvania.  This diagnostic investigation was first reported at a 
conference on the mind of a child held at the Moritz College of Law at The Ohio State University in 
March, 2005.  I would like to thank Kate Federle and Joshua Dressler for their efforts.  Stephanos 
Bibas, Ed Greenlee, and Dave Rudovsky provided invaluable help.  As always, my personal attorney, 
Jean Avnet Morse, furnished sound and sober counsel and moral support.   
1   543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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diagnosis, to evaluate the disorder in the Roper arguments, and to suggest the route 
to total cure.  Footnotes will be scarce.  Most of this note is an extended conceptual 
argument or based on this investigator’s first-hand clinical observations.  Where it 
depends on assertions about the state of the science, it takes positions, albeit 
sometimes controversial, that have strong support.  Trust me: I’m a doctor (of 
psychology). 
 
II. DECLARATION OF INTEREST   
 
Many journals in psychiatry and medicine now ask authors to include a 
“declaration of interest” to indicate possible conflicts of interests or other 
influences on the author’s conclusions.  For example, sources of support for the 
research should be disclosed.  As a diagnostic investigator and in the spirit of 
disclosure, please permit me to list the most important philosophical, moral and 
legal commitments with which I approach this investigation.  First, I am a 
thorough-going, matter-up materialist who believes that all mental and behavioral 
activity is the causal product of lawful physical events in the brain.  Second, I am a 
non-reductive materialist who believes, roughly, with John Searle and many 
others, that conscious mental states are real, that they are caused by lower level 
biological processes in the brain, that conscious states are realized in the brain—
the mind-brain—but not at the level of neurons, and that conscious states can be 
causally efficacious.2  Third, I am a compatibilist who believes that moral and 
criminal responsibility are compatible with determinism or universal causation.  
Fourth, I believe that desert is a necessary condition of just punishment under 
current law and that it should be at least a partial justification for the fair 
imposition of punishment under any proposed criminal law.  Last, I oppose the 
death penalty. 
 
III. THINKING ABOUT NEUROSCIENCE AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
This section considers the logical and conceptual space in which claims about 
the relation of neuroscience to responsibility can arise. 
To think sensibly about the relation of any other variable—whether that 
variable is biological, psychological, sociological, or astrological—to criminal 
responsibility first requires that one have an account of criminal responsibility.  
After all, one cannot relate two variables to one another unless one has a definition 
of both.  Assuming that one has a definition of criminal responsibility, then the 
argument based on the other variable may be either internal or external.  An 
internal argument accepts that criminal responsibility is a coherent concept and 
uses the other variable to explain the positive rules and practices we have or to 
criticize those rules and practices normatively for the purpose of improving them.  
                                                                                                                                                   
2   JOHN R. SEARLE, MIND: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION 113–14 (2004) (terming his position about 
consciousness “biological naturalism”). 
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An external argument uses the other variable to demonstrate that the concept of 
criminal responsibility is incoherent or unjustifiable and therefore it should be 
abandoned.  Thus, any commentator who accepts that at least some people who 
commit crimes are responsible and may justifiably be punished are necessarily 
making an internal argument, at least implicitly, because the justifiability of 
responsibility is assumed.   
 
A. A Positive Account of Criminal Responsibility 
 
As a matter of current, positive common law, an agent will be prima facie 
criminally responsible if the agent acts intentionally and with the appropriate 
mental state, the mens rea, required by the definition of the offense, such as 
purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence.  Criminal law typically defines 
an act as an intentional bodily movement performed by an agent whose 
consciousness is reasonably intact.  Mental states have their ordinary language, 
common-sense meanings.  If the agent does not act at all because the bodily 
movement was not intentional or the agent’s consciousness was substantially 
compromised, the agent is not prima facie responsible.  Similarly, if the agent 
lacks a requisite mental state, the agent is also not prima facie criminally 
responsible.  Even if the agent is fully prima facie responsible, however, the agent 
ultimately may still not be criminally responsible if an excusing condition, an 
affirmative defense, such as legal insanity (essentially a rationality defect) or 
duress (a compelling “hard choice” situation, such as a “do-it-or-else” threat at 
gunpoint) was present when the agent committed the offense.  A defendant who 
wants to avoid imputation of criminal responsibility must create reasonable doubt 
about whether he or she acted intentionally, consciously and with the required 
mens rea, or the defendant must establish an affirmative defense.  Although one 
might quibble about details, I believe that this account accurately reflects the law’s 
current conception of criminal responsibility. 
The concept of the responsible legal person implicit in this account is an 
intentional, reasonably fully conscious and potentially rational agent who is not 
exposed to an unreasonably hard choice about whether to offend.  The specific 
criteria for prima facie responsibility and excuse are all behavioral, broadly 
conceived as conduct and mental states.  The causes for the behavioral criteria are 
not part of the criteria themselves.  For example, an agent’s capacity for rationality 
might be diminished by faulty neurotransmitters, psychological stress, trauma, or a 
host of other causes.  The excusing condition is the lack of rational capacity.   
The underlying biological, psychological, sociological, and astrological 
causes for any of the criteria for criminal responsibility, including mental states, 
can be nothing more than evidentiary support for the assertion that the criterion in 
question was in fact satisfied at the time of the crime.  Causation cannot be an 
excuse per se for an internalist, who accepts responsibility, because all behavior is 
caused and thus all behavior would have to be excused.  I have termed the 
erroneous belief to the contrary the “fundamental psycholegal error.”  It is as 
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erroneous when the postulated cause of behavior is neurological as when it is 
psychological, sociological, or astrological.  Once one has assumed that 
responsibility is possible, causation cannot excuse per se. 
All the criteria for criminal responsibility are normative.  The meaning of 
rationality and how much rational capacity must be present for responsibility, for 
example, are legal issues that the law must decide.  Other disciplines might provide 
potentially relevant knowledge about human behavioral capacities, but the other, 
empirical disciplines must fall silent about the ultimate criteria the law adopts.  No 
general finding from any other discipline entails any general legal conclusion 
about legal responsibility unless it conclusively undermines the possibility of 
responsibility at all, in which case it is the basis for an external rather than an 
internal critique.  Moreover, demonstrable differences among people or groups of 
people concerning the criteria do not mean that the law must treat them differently.  
For example, one person may be more rational than another, but they both may be 
rational enough to deserve the same punishment for the same crime committed 
under similar circumstances.  No normative differences are logically entailed by 
behavioral differences unless, counter-factually to reality, the behavioral 
differences precisely track the normative differences. 
Finally, we assess all the criminal law’s behavioral criteria for responsibility 
primarily by considering evidence of the defendant’s conduct, including speech 
acts, and drawing inferences from that conduct.  Based on the behavioral evidence, 
it seems patently obvious, and few commentators disagree, that most agents who 
appear to violate criminal prohibitions act intentionally, consciously, with the 
requisite mens rea, possess the capacity for rationality (by any sensible standard), 
and do not act under a hard choice threat.  
 
B. Internal Arguments: Neuroscience and the Assessment of Criminal 
Responsibility  
 
The new neuroscience might logically assist assessment of criminal 
responsibility in specific cases and in general.  In specific cases, we will virtually 
never have direct neuroscientific evidence contemporaneous with the time of the 
crime.  At most, we will have ex ante or ex post evidence that can produce 
inferences of varying validity about brain structure and function at the time of the 
crime.  Moreover, at present, neuroscience is insufficiently advanced to offer 
precise data that will be genuinely legally relevant.  Thus, even if the science is 
good enough to pass muster for admission as expert scientific evidence under 
federal and state evidentiary rules, it may still be inadmissible because it will not 
be probative.  As neuroscience advances, it may become probative in a wider class 
of cases, but we have not yet reached this stage. 
Despite the foregoing qualifications, neuroscience evidence may be relevant 
in two classes of specific cases.  First, in cases in which the behavioral evidence 
concerning prima facie liability or an affirmative defense seems clear, 
neuroscientific evidence may demonstrate that appearances are deceptive.  For 
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example, neuroscience might indicate that a defendant who appeared to have been 
acting consciously was in fact acting in an unconscious or automatic state, such as 
sleepwalking or in the wake of physical trauma.  Or, neuroscience might indicate 
that an apparently entirely rational defendant lacked the capacity for rationality.  I 
speculate that such cases will be rare.  Further, when the behavioral evidence is 
clear and the potentially conflicting neuroscience will be inevitably speculative to 
a greater or lesser degree, common sense dictates that we should believe the 
behavioral evidence rather than the neuroscience evidence because the criteria for 
responsibility are behavioral.  Still, this is a logical possibility. 
A second class of specific cases involves those in which the behavioral 
evidence is in doubt.  For example, suppose the defendant had received a blow to 
the head not long before committing an offense and whether the defendant acted 
consciously is unclear.  Neuroscience will rarely be dispositive in such cases 
because the relation of the brain to complex behavior is itself immensely complex 
and beyond all but the most general current understanding.  Nonetheless, in some 
cases valid neuroscience will help the finder of fact resolve the legal issue, 
although caution must always be exercised because the neuroscientific evidence 
often will not be sufficiently contemporaneous to permit valid inferences about the 
time of the crime.  Such cases may arise relatively frequently, especially as 
advances in neuroscience allow more precise specification of how the brain affects 
behavior.  I do not know how large this class of cases is, but it is surely 
considerably larger than the first class. 
Neuroscience might be relevant in general if its findings demonstrate that the 
current criteria for criminal responsibility are unjust because they do not comport 
with our biologically-based understanding of behavior.  For example, some claim 
that the number of defendants who do not meet the criminal law’s current criteria 
for conscious action is much larger than we believe.  This type of claim goes far 
beyond the argument that neuroscience will be relevant in large numbers of 
specific cases.  It may suggest that the law’s criteria are too narrow generally and 
must be normatively reformed to be just.  Such claims would of course be hard to 
support if the behavioral evidence were clearly to the contrary.  What kind of 
neuroscience evidence would it take to convince us that when we act, most of the 
time most of us are not conscious (according to any sensible standard of 
consciousness)?   
 
C. External Arguments: Criminal Responsibility Rejected 
 
At the extreme, claims about the general implications of neuroscience may 
cease to be the basis of a normative critique of criminal responsibility conceptions 
and may become an external critique of the coherence or justice of the possibility 
of responsibility tout court.  Two types of external criticism are possible.  First, the 
externalist might claim that responsibility is impossible because its criteria are 
based on a conception of human action that is simply wrong.  We are not the type 
of creatures we take ourselves to be.  For example, suppose, despite all common-
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sense first-person and third-person evidence to the contrary, neuroscience could 
show that all human conduct is done in a state indistinguishable from spasm or 
sleepwalking, or, more extravagantly, that we do not have mental states at all.  In a 
word, suppose neuroscience could demonstrate conclusively that all of us all the 
time are automatons or without any mental life whatsoever and that thinking 
otherwise is simply an illusion.  In the philosophy of mind, such arguments are 
associated with various forms of reductive or eliminative materialism.   
No current conception of responsibility that would support imposing deserved 
blame and punishment can accept blaming and punishing those who act 
automatically or creatures that have no mental life.  If this were really the case, 
rationality would demand that the criminal law would have to abandon any robust 
notion of responsibility and seek alternative means of ordering human affairs and 
protecting society.  (One might ask whether automatons or creatures without minds 
can rationally decide how to respond to their own status as automatons, but let us 
leave this question for another day.) 
The second type of external critique accepts that we are the types of 
intentional, conscious, potentially rational creatures that we take ourselves to be, a 
position associated with various forms of non-reductive materialism in the 
philosophy of mind.  But the second external critique denies that anyone can be 
genuinely responsible because neuroscience and other disciplines conclusively 
demonstrate that all our actions are mechanistically determined and determinism 
(or universal causation or some such) is incompatible with ultimate responsibility.  
In the philosophy of responsibility, this position is termed “incompatibilism.”  This 
is a perfectly respectable conceptual position, but it cannot be proven 
metaphysically or normatively to be right.  Many thorough-going naturalists, such 
as myself, who believe that all the phenomena of the universe are causally 
explicable by natural physical laws, believe that responsibility is compatible with 
determinism, a position termed “compatibilism.”  Indeed, compatibilism is 
probably the dominant position among philosophers of responsibility.  It is surely 
the position that best explains our responsibility practices, which hold some people 
accountable but excuse others.  Science cannot resolve the dispute because the 
issue is metaphysical and normative and it is unlikely ever to be resolved by logic.  
Finally, proponents of deterministic type arguments cannot have it both ways.  
They must either accept jettisoning any responsibility for anyone or they must 
recognize that determinism, which is not selective or partial, is not a criterion that 
bears on responsibility. 
In conclusion, the first type of external critique fundamentally denies our 
ordinary understanding of ourselves and is conceivably demonstrable by scientific 
findings.  Until it does so, however, it is unlikely to undermine the powerful sense 
we all have of the efficacy and importance of mental states and reason.  The 
second external critique is also unlikely to be successful because many people, the 
compatibilists, believe already that it is just to hold others responsible despite the 
belief that determinism or universal causation is true.  Some day, an external 
critique may convince us to abandon criminal responsibility, but for now such 
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arguments are academic in the most literal sense.  Only internal critiques have a 
chance on the ground. 
Now that we have explored generally the logical relation between brain 
explanations and criminal responsibility, let us turn to the errors that are the signs 
and symptoms of Brain Overclaim Syndrome. 
 
IV. BRAIN OVERCLAIM SYNDROME: THE SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS 
 
New, powerful scientific findings about the correlates and causes of behavior 
often have a potent and, alas, rationality-unhinging effect on the thinking of 
Potential Commentators [PCs].  Most flow from misunderstanding the relation 
between brains and responsibility that the last section considered.  This section 
attempts to catalogue those effects that I have identified to date, many of which are 
related to each other, but the list has no pretensions to being complete.  After all, 
this is a preliminary diagnostic investigation and future investigators may discover 
hitherto unidentified signs and symptoms.  The final pathway in all cases, 
however, is that more legal implications are claimed for the brain science than can 
be justified. 
 
A. Confusion About the Relation Between Brain and Complex, Intentional Action 
 
For a materialist, the brain always plays a causal role in behavior.  Despite all 
the astonishing recent advances in neuroscience, however, we still know woefully 
little about how the brain enables the mind, and especially about how 
consciousness and intentionality can arise from the complicated hunk of matter 
that is the brain.  At a recent conference on the abnormal brain, the eminent 
philosopher of mind and action, John Searle, opened his keynote speech by telling 
the following anecdote.3  Some years ago, Searle said, he decided to learn what the 
new neuroscience had to teach about the relation of brain to mind and action.  He 
devoured the most important texts only to be dismayed that these texts did not all 
begin with a disclaimer that we do not know much about this relation yet.  Just so.   
Brain imaging studies have been the most potent pathogen causing BOS, so it 
is useful to say a few words about such studies.  Imaging is at present very 
expensive and requires carefully chosen and cooperative subjects.  Consequently, 
the number of experimental subjects and controls in any study tends to be small 
and precise replications are infrequent.  The problem of small samples will 
probably be remedied by advances in the efficiency of the technology of 
imaging—indeed, this is already happening for readings of activity at the surface 
of the brain—but for now it is a dominant feature of imaging studies.   
Statistically valid findings are based on mean differences and do not imply 
that there is an absolutely clear distinction between the experimental and control 
                                                                                                                                                   
3   John Searle, Keynote Address at the Arizona State University College of Law Conference: 
The Abnormal Brain and Criminal Responsibility (Apr. 29, 2005).   
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groups.  Usually there is substantial overlap, meaning that some individual 
experimental brains look like individual control brains and vice versa.  For 
example, suppose the experimental hypothesis is that task X will cause brain 
region Y to be activated.  After controlling for other variables that might cause Y 
to be activated in both the experimental and control conditions (the “subtraction” 
method), the investigators discover that there is still a difference: Y is activated 
statistically significantly more in the experimental subjects.  Nonetheless, some 
experimental subjects will not have Y activated by X and some control subjects 
will.  Therefore, one could not predict perfectly from the brain image whether the 
subject was an experimental or a control.  The question would always be how 
much overlap there was between the two groups.  The greater the overlap, the more 
difficult it would be to predict that subject’s experimental or control status from 
the image.4 
Discovering the neural correlates of mental phenomena does not tell us how 
these phenomena are possible.  For example, we may be able to identify the neural 
correlates of consciousness, but we do not have a clue about how those parts of the 
brain make subjective experience possible.  Moreover, the causation of virtually 
any complex behavior is affected by psychological and sociological variables, even 
when brain causation has been identified.  For example, the brains of late 
adolescents are almost certainly the same around the globe—holding nutrition and 
the like constant—but the rates of behaviors associated with immature adolescent 
brains, such as impulsive criminality, vary widely from place to place and from 
time to time.  Monolithic brain explanation of complex behavior is almost always 
radically incomplete. 
Certain lesions can of course disable various human capacities, but few 
criminal responsibility cases in which the result is not already obvious based on 
behavioral evidence will involve a precise, identifiable neurological mechanism 
that will demonstrate that criminal responsibility was not present.  Further, current 
neuroscience cannot begin to demonstrate that our view of ourselves as generally 
conscious, intentional, and potentially rational agents is false. 
Until we know vastly more than we do now, in most cases we will not be in a 
position to add much to assessing responsibility behaviorally in individual cases, 
and even less do we have the resources to mount a potentially convincing external 
                                                                                                                                                   
4   At the conference at which this diagnostic note was first presented, I asked with what 
accuracy, based only on the images of myelination, one could accurately distinguish the individual 
brains of sixteen and seventeen year olds on the one hand and eighteen and nineteen year olds on the 
other.  One neuroscientist claimed that the scientist could do this with great accuracy if the scientist 
were furnished with the sex and handedness of the subject.  This claim would have been quite 
believable if the comparison groups were thirteen and fourteen year olds versus twenty-five and 
twenty-six year olds, but it seemed doubtful to me because development is continuous and the groups 
were so close in age.  After the conference, I therefore asked the question of other equally 
credentialed and experienced neuroscientists and neuroanatomists.  My informants uniformly agreed 
that they could not very accurately distinguish sixteen and seventeen year old brains from eighteen 
and nineteen year old brains.  I do not know who is right.  To the best of my knowledge, a study to 
determine accuracy of this type has not been performed, but the outcome would be very interesting. 
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critique of responsibility vel non.  In individual cases in which neuroscientific 
findings could be demonstrated to be genuinely relevant and probative, they should 
of course be admissible consistent with the usual evidentiary standards for 
scientific evidence.    
 
B. The Confusion of Internal and External Critiques 
 
Causation is not per se an excusing condition and partial causation does not 
exist.  If this is a causal world, as neuroscientists and I believe, then all phenomena 
are fully caused by their necessary and sufficient causal conditions.  Partial 
knowledge about causation does not mean that there is partial causation.  
Causation is also not the equivalent of being subjected to compulsion, which exists 
when the agent is non-culpably faced with a normative hard choice.  All behavior 
is caused, but not all behavior results from a threat at gunpoint or the equivalent.  
And to think that causation per se excuses is an external critique.  If causation 
excuses per se or is the equivalent of compulsion, responsibility as we know it is 
impossible.  As an argument from within our responsibility practices, it is the 
fundamental psycholegal error to argue that causation excuses.  The discovery that 
the brain, including a brain abnormality, played some causal role in the production 
of what is undeniably human action does not lead to any legal conclusions about 
responsibility.  The proper internal question is whether the neuroscience evidence 
helps to establish the presence or absence of action, mental states or a genuine 
affirmative defense, such as lack of rational capacity. 
 
C.  Misunderstanding the Criteria for Responsibility 
 
The criteria for responsibility are behavioral and normative, not empirically 
demonstrable states of the brain.  Even if there were a perfect correlation between 
brain states and the behavioral criteria for responsibility, the brain states would be 
nothing more than evidence of the behavioral states.  Such a correlation is a 
fantasy based on present knowledge and probably always will be when we are 
considering complex human actions.  If the person meets the behavioral criteria for 
responsibility, the person should be held responsible, whatever the brain evidence 
may indicate, such as the presence of an abnormality.  If the person does not meet 
the behavioral criteria, the person should be held not responsible, however normal 
the brain may look.  Brains are not held responsible.  Acting people are.  To 
believe that brain evidence has more than simple evidentiary value for assessing 
responsibility is to misconceive the criteria for responsibility.   
One could claim, of course, that normatively the law should adopt brain-based 
criteria for responsibility, but this would be a category mistake.  Even if it is not, it 
amounts to an external critique.  In the alternative, one could argue that the 
positive account of responsibility that I have presented is fundamentally incorrect 
and that the brain science is more relevant to the properly understood criteria of 
responsibility.  Perhaps so, but this requires an argument to demonstrate that the 
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account is wrong.  Finally, one could argue that the behavioral and normative 
criteria should be different as a result of what we have learned from brain science 
and other disciplines.  This would be an internal critique that would depend on a 
normative argument about the relevance of brain science to responsibility.  If this 
argument went through, however, it would not undermine this diagnostic note’s 
claims about the relevance of brain science to current, positive responsibility 
criteria, and, even then, the brain science would still be relevant only as evidence 
concerning the new, improved behavioral responsibility criteria. 
 
D. The Confusion of the Normative and the Positive 
 
Factual behavioral differences between people do not entail the necessity of 
differential legal treatment unless one is operating under a normative theory that 
indicates why the factual difference should make a legal difference.  I am not 
suggesting that it is impossible to derive an “ought” from an “is,” a contentious 
issue most famously addressed by David Hume.  I am agnostic about this.  I am 
claiming, however, that one cannot assume an “ought” from an “is.”  This requires 
an argument. 
Suppose that we can reliably identify valid group differences, say, between 
men and women on measures of upper body strength, a capacity useful in some 
occupations, such as fighting fires.  Should the ranks of firefighters be limited to 
men?  Of course not, because we might decide that values of equality trump those 
of efficiency or because we think that we can individualize decisions about an 
applicant’s ability to do the job.  Even if proportionately fewer women might 
qualify, some surely will, and we would not be able to predict whether an applicant 
could do the job based solely on sex.  Virtually no finding, no practice, however 
hoary, necessarily entails any normative outcome without an argument about why 
it should.  This is as true of neuroscience evidence as of any other kind of scientific 
evidence.  Neuroscience evidence may provide premises in normative arguments, 
but it does not alone entail conclusions.  To think otherwise is to confuse the 
positive with the normative. 
In conclusion, based on the foregoing confusions and others that may be 
identified, the final pathway, the final expression of BOS is to make claims about 
the relation of the brain to responsibility that cannot be sustained logically or 
empirically. 
 
V. EVALUATING ROPER 
 
Few if any responsible commentators who accept the coherence and validity 
of criminal responsibility ascriptions—the internalists—claim that most adolescent 
offenders commit their crimes in automatic states or without mens rea.  Crimes 
committed impulsively, for example, are still committed consciously and 
intentionally.  Nor do most commentators claim that late adolescent offenders do 
not know the nature and quality of their acts, do not know their acts are wrong, or 
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act in response to duress.  No evidence from the behavioral or neurosciences even 
hints that the contrary might be true.  Rather, the claim is that culpable adolescents, 
whose behavior meets the prima facie case for guilt and who do not have an 
affirmative defense, are nonetheless less criminally responsible because they have 
insufficiently developed rationality.  Thus, to be relevant, any evidence must be 
addressed to the sixteen and seventeen year olds’ capacity for rationality, broadly 
speaking. 
In Thompson v. Oklahoma,5 the Supreme Court barred capital punishment of 
murderers who killed when they were fifteen years old or younger, and in Atkins v. 
Virginia,6 the high Court categorically prohibited capital punishment of convicted 
killers with mental retardation.  Although the Court provided many reasons for its 
Thompson and Atkins holdings, crucial to both was the conclusion that younger 
adolescents and persons with retardation are categorically less culpable, less 
responsible, and therefore do not deserve capital punishment.  The operative 
language in Atkins concerning culpability and responsibility is instructive.  The 
Court wrote: 
 
Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference between right 
and wrong . . . .  Because of their impairments, however, by definition 
they have diminished capacities to understand and process information, 
to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to 
engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the 
reactions of others . . . .  Their deficiencies do not warrant an exemption 
from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their personal culpability.   
. . . .  
With respect to retribution—the interest in seeing that the offender 
gets his “just deserts”—the severity of the appropriate punishment 
necessarily depends on the culpability of the offender.7 
 
All the criteria the Court mentions are behavioral (broadly understood to refer to 
cognitive and “control” functioning8) and their relevance to criminal responsibility 
is based on the relation to desert.  
Advocates of abolition in Roper seized on this language to make similar 
arguments concerning sixteen and seventeen year old murderers.  Although 
apparently normal adolescents do not suffer from abnormal impairments, lack of 
full developmental maturation allegedly distinguishes them from adults on 
                                                                                                                                                   
5   487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
6   536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
7   Id. at 318–19; see also Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834−35. 
8   I put “control” in scare quotes because I am highly skeptical about claims concerning lack 
of control as an independent mitigating or excusing condition.  I argue that lack of control can always 
be reduced to a cognitive deficiency.  Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 
88 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1054−63 (2002). 
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behavioral dimensions, such as the capacity for judgment, that are relevant to 
rationality and therefore to responsibility and desert.    
What was striking and new about the argument in Roper, however, was that 
advocates of abolition used newly discovered neuroscientific evidence concerning 
the adolescent brain to bolster their argument that sixteen and seventeen year old 
killers do not deserve to die.  Editorial pages encouraged the High Court to 
consider the neuroscientific evidence to help it reach its decision.  Although 
neuroscience evidence had been adduced in earlier, high profile cases, such as the 
1982 prosecution of John Hinckley, Jr. for the attempted assassination of President 
Reagan and others, Roper has been the most important case to propose use of the 
new neuroscience to affect responsibility questions generally.  Indeed, the 
American Medical Association, the American Bar Association, the American 
Psychiatric Association, and the American Psychological Association, among 
others, all filed or subscribed to amicus briefs urging abolition based in part on the 
neuroscience findings.  The real question was whether and how the new 
neuroscience was relevant to responsibility ascriptions and just punishment for 
adolescent offenders (or anyone else). 
Here is the opening of the summary of the amicus brief filed by, inter alia, the 
American Medical Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the 
American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, and the American 
Academy of Psychiatry and the Law: “The adolescent’s mind works differently 
from ours.  Parents know it.  This Court [the United States Supreme Court] has 
said it.  Legislatures have presumed it for decades or more.”9 
Precisely.  The brief points to evidence concerning impulsivity, poor short 
term risk and long term benefit estimations, emotional volatility, and susceptibility 
to stress among adolescents compared to adults.  These are common sense, 
“fireside” conclusions that parents and others have drawn in one form or another 
since time immemorial.  In recent years, common sense has been bolstered by 
methodologically rigorous behavioral investigations that have confirmed ordinary 
wisdom.  Most important, all these behavioral characteristics are clearly relevant to 
responsibility because they all bear on the adolescent’s capacity for rationality.  
Without any further scientific evidence, advocates of abolition would have an 
entirely ample factual basis to support the types of moral and constitutional claims 
they made.   
The Roper briefs were filled with discussion of new neuroscientific evidence 
that confirms that adolescent brains are different from adult brains in ways 
consistent with the observed behavioral differences that alone bear on culpability 
and responsibility.  Assuming the validity of the neuroscientific evidence, what 
does it add?  The rigorous behavioral studies already confirm the behavioral 
differences.  No one thinks that these data are invalid because adolescent subjects 
are faking or for some other reason.  The moral and constitutional implications of 
                                                                                                                                                   
9   Brief of the American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent 
at 2, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633). 
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the data may be controversial, but the data are not.  At most, the neuroscientific 
evidence provides a partial causal explanation of why the observed behavioral 
differences exist and thus some further evidence of the validity of the behavioral 
differences.  It is only of limited and indirect relevance to responsibility 
assessment, which is based on behavioral criteria. 
Advocates claimed, however, that the neuroscience confirmed that 
adolescents are insufficiently responsible to be executed, thus confusing the 
positive and the normative.  The neuroscience evidence in no way independently 
confirms that adolescents are less responsible.  If the behavioral differences 
between adolescents and adults were slight, it would not matter if their brains are 
quite different.  Similarly, if the behavioral differences were sufficient for moral 
and constitutional differential treatment, then it would not matter if the brains were 
essentially indistinguishable.    
Decisions regarding whether the mean differences are large enough and 
whether the overlap between the two populations is small enough to warrant 
treating adolescents differently categorically as a class rather than trying to 
individuate responsibility are normative, moral, political, social, and ultimately 
legal constitutional questions about which behavioral and neuroscience must 
finally fall silent.  Even if there were virtually no behavioral or brain overlaps 
between, say, sixteen and seventeen year olds on the one hand and eighteen and 
nineteen year olds on the other, it would still not entail that we must categorize 
rather than individuate.  After all, because there is overlap—indeed, substantial 
overlap in the groups just mentioned—we know that some sixteen and seventeen 
years olds will be behaviorally and neurologically indistinguishable from many 
eighteen and nineteen year olds.  Finally, even if there were no behavioral or brain 
overlap whatsoever, it would still not entail that abolition was constitutionally 
mandated.  As a normative matter, the Court could decide that sixteen and 
seventeen year olds are responsible enough to be executed despite all of them 
being less responsible than older murderers.  Assuming the validity of the findings 
of behavioral and biological difference, the size of that difference entails no 
necessary moral or constitutional conclusions.  
In the event, the Roper majority cited many reasons for its decision, including 
the abundant common sense and behavioral science evidence that adolescents 
differ from adults.  This evidence demonstrates, said the Court, “that juvenile 
offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders,” for 
whom capital punishment is reserved.  The Court cited three differences: 
adolescents have “[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility;”10 adolescents are more “vulnerable or susceptible to negative 
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure,” a difference in part 
explained by the adolescent’s weaker control or experience of control over his or 
her own environment; adolescents do not have fully formed characters.11  As a 
                                                                                                                                                   
10  Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). 
11  Id.  
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result of these factors—all of which, we may note, are behavioral and all of which 
can be confirmed with behavioral evidence alone—juvenile culpability is 
diminished and the penological justifications for capital punishment apply to 
adolescents with “lesser force.”12 The Court’s opinion thus reflects two 
conclusions: the group difference between the rationality of late adolescents and of 
adults is constitutionally significant for Eighth Amendment purposes and it is large 
enough to justify abandoning individualized decision-making concerning 
responsibility for the former. 
Characteristically, the Court did not cite much evidence for the empirical 
propositions that supported its diminished culpability argument.  What is notable, 
however, is that the Court did not cite any of the neuroscience evidence concerning 
myelination and pruning that the amici and others had urged them to rely on.  It did 
cite six behavioral sources, five of which were high quality behavioral science.  
Perhaps the neuroscience evidence actually played a role in the decision, as many 
advocates for the use of neuroscience would like to believe, but there is no 
evidence in the opinion to support this speculation.   
As this note has argued, the behavioral science was crucial to proper 
resolution of the case and furnished completely adequate resources to decide the 
issue.  The neuroscience was largely irrelevant.  The reasoning of the case is 
consistent with this argument and the opinion showed no signs of Brain Overclaim 
Syndrome.  In my view, Roper properly disregarded the neuroscience evidence and 
thus did not provide unwarranted legitimation for the use of such evidence to 
decide culpability questions generally. 
 
VI. THE ROYAL ROAD TO COMPLETE RECOVERY:  
COGNITIVE-JUROTHERAPY [CJ] FOR BOS 
 
The signs and symptoms of BOS are all cognitive.  I therefore propose that CJ 
is likely to be the best treatment.  The therapeutic techniques, all of which require 
motivation, effort and practice, follow directly from the signs and symptoms of 
BOS. 
First, the Potential Commentator [PC] must have a good understanding of the 
relevance of the new neuroscience to complex behavior generally, including an 
understanding of the relevant literature in philosophy of mind.  Reasonable minds 
can differ about the basic neuroscience and the philosophy of mind, of course, and 
disagreement is not a sign of BOS.  But naive neuroscience and philosophy of 
mind and question-begging about these subjects are signs, although they are 
completely curable. 
Second, the PC must understand whether his or her contribution is an internal 
or external criticism, and what type it is within the two broad domains.  Confusion 
between and within the critical domains must at all costs be avoided.  This is also 
simple enough if one understands the distinctions. 
                                                                                                                                                   
12  Id. at 571. 
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Third, the PC must be very clear about precisely what criteria for criminal 
responsibility he or she is using and about whether it is a positive account of the 
current state of the law or a proposed account of what the law should be.  There 
may of course be disagreement about the current state of the law, and, once again, 
disagreement is not a sign or symptom of BOS.  But using naive criteria and 
question-begging about the criteria, without argument, are signs.  If the PC is 
offering a proposed account, the PC should set forth the argument for why the 
legal system should accept this account.  In either case, the criteria should be clear 
enough to permit reasonably apparent conclusions about the relevance of brain 
evidence to those criteria. 
Fourth, the PC must understand the positive/normative distinction, and if he 
or she wishes to use brain findings as premises in an argument for legal change, the 
normative reasons for preferring the change should be crisply identified. 
All of the above is really just a “high falutin,” partially tongue-in-cheek way 
of suggesting that people need to think more clearly and make more transparent, 
logical arguments about the relationship of anything to criminal responsibility.  
The question is why more PCs do not do this.  I do not know the answer, but I 
suspect that two primary culprits are at work: intellectual naiveté and ideological 
blinders.  Sophisticated, non-hand waving treatment of these issues requires a lot 
of capital investment by lawyers in disciplines outside the law and by non-lawyers 
in the law.  Many PCs do not have the capital, but this is easily remedied by 
appropriate investment.   
Ideological blinders are harder to fix, and sometimes it is not clear what role 
ideology is playing.  Is the PC making an argument he or she knows is not the best 
argument because it supports his or her position and it does (barely) pass the 
“smell test”?  I suppose that this is less objectionable for a practitioner than for a 
scholar, although it is less objectionable even for scholars if they are openly 
engaging in advocacy.  Or, is the desire to achieve a certain result so important that 
the PC does not even recognize that the argument deployed is weak?  This is a 
problem for anyone.   
My impression is that most people who wish to inject neuroscience into 
criminal responsibility assessments believe that the neuroscience must necessarily 
be exculpatory.  We have seen that this does not follow, and, indeed, even if 
neuroscience could be demonstrated to be routinely relevant, it is a knife that cuts 
both ways.  Unless one makes the fundamental psycholegal error of believing that 
causation per se excuses, it is clear that neuroscience might also be a means to 
inculpate.  One is reminded of the analogy to DNA evidence.  For the moment it is 
being used extensively to exculpate alleged murderers on death row, but as many 
have pointed out, if inaccuracy is the primary criticism of application of the death 
penalty, DNA could erode that critique and give new impetus to capital 
punishment. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
 
As the biological and behavioral sciences offer ever more sophisticated 
understandings of normal and abnormal behavior alike, there will be constant 
pressure to use their findings to affect assessment of criminal responsibility and 
other legal doctrines.  A lot will be at stake morally, politically and legally, and 
much will be debatable.  I hope, however, that this modest contribution will help 
identify and ameliorate a pathological entity that can deleteriously affect the 
debate.   
